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This thesis examines the adoption of no-fault divorce laws through sociology of law 
functionalist and conflict/feminist perspectives. Previous research on the adoption of no-
fault divorce laws has focused primarily on the after math, but little attention has been 
paid to those factors influencing which states' adopted these laws. This paper will look at 
the discord between written laws and laws in action and the gendered opportunity 
structures in each state to determine what relationship exists between these factors and 
the adoption of two types of no-fault divorce. The results indicate states that adopted a 
pure no-fault divorce system, one that eliminates fault from divorce and alimony 
decisions, were more likely to have a greater dissonance between their written laws and 
the laws' actual application compared with those states that retained the use of fault in 
alimony allotments. States that adopted a pure no-fault system also had more open 
gendered opportunity structures than those that retained fault in alimony. 
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Laws are a product of society; as societal norms, ideologies, and behaviors change, laws 
that lose their functionality should change as well. The 1960s and 1970s were decades of 
tremendous social change. The second wave of feminism emerged in this period, alongside the 
struggle for racial equality, as well as a new emphasis on the goals of individual satisfaction and 
self-realization. Traditional ideologies of separate spheres were displaced as women increasingly 
sought personal development rather than satisfaction from family roles and men. As ideologies 
change, opportunity structures shift to allow previously oppressed groups access to those 
institutions once denied. Macro-level change in gender ideologies coincided with a movement in 
Western countries away from fault requirements in divorce law to the more liberal idea of 
irretrievable breakdown (Phillips 1988). While most states adopted no-fault grounds for divorce 
proceedings by the end of the 1970s, many retained fault as a consideration in alimony 
apportionments. It is plausible that this distinction is associated with state level variation in 
women’s status and gender relations, a topic that has received little attention in the literature. 
This paper will examine the relationship between state-level variation in gendered opportunity 
structures and the adoption of a “pure” no-fault divorce system. 
Prior to 1960, divorce laws worked to maintain and reinforce the gender hierarchy both 
within and outside of the family. Based on a cultural norm of separate spheres, divorce laws were 
written and implemented to encourage spouses to play the appropriate gendered role. The world, 
within this legal framework, was divided into the public and private spheres, and spouses’ roles 
were clearly defined. The private sphere was the home, and this area was designated to the wife. 
Her role in traditional marriage was to raise the children and maintain the household so the 
husband was able to focus entirely on his role of economically supporting the family. The public 
sphere, which included societal institutions such as the economy, higher education, and politics, 
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was reserved for men, because of the presumed functional nature of the male breadwinner, 
female caregiver family system. Traditional divorce laws were written as narrowly as possible to 
restrict access to divorce. Those few acceptable grounds for divorce were defined by the 
gendered spheres of the family and the spouses’ fulfillment of their designated role (Fine & Fine 
1994, Weitzman 1985).  
Most states abandoned this traditional construction of the family and divorce by the end 
of the 1970s and adopted some form of no-fault divorce. Two perspectives on why widespread 
divorce reform occurred dominate the literature. On the one hand, the functionalist perspective, 
seen in the arguments of Jacob (1988) and Weitzman (1985), posits that reform resulted from 
“routine” policy making guided by experts in family law and was not the result of social activism 
or political conflict. Experts were motivated by a desire to reduce the dissonance between how 
divorce law was actually administered and how the law was formally codified. One the other 
hand, the conflict/feminist perspective suggests that reform occurred because of the struggle for 
gender equality within the family and the larger society and related changes in gendered 
opportunity structures (Allen 1998, Fuchs 1983). 
This research extends prior studies by framing the change in divorce law broadly within 
the sociology of law paradigm, specifically employing functionalist and conflict/feminist legal 
theory. Previous research on divorce reform has focused on the relationship between state 
variation in divorce reform and subsequent changes in the divorce rate, examined individual 
level consequences of divorce, or hypothesized a causal link between the phenomenon of no-
fault divorce and national level changes in gender roles and ideologies. Little research has 
examined state-level variation in factors associated with divorce reform. Yet, only 22 states 
adopted “pure” no-fault divorce laws whereas the remainder continued to use fault in alimony 
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decisions. Prior work has found that state-level variation in the gendered opportunity structure is 
associated with key legal shifts in women’s status, such as women’s suffrage and state 
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (McCammon et al. 2001, Soule & Olzak 2004). 
Hence, investigating whether state differences in the gendered opportunity structure are 
associated with the type of divorce reform adopted will advance sociological knowledge about 
the mechanisms that link societal shifts in norms and ideological climates and changes in the 
law. 
Background on Divorce Laws in the U.S. 
 
Divorce law is unique in the United States because there is no uniform national law; 
instead each state gets to determine its own grounds for divorce. Despite this, the US’ common 
law ancestry viewed marriage as an “indissoluble union;” adultery was not even a ground for 
divorce until 1857 in England. Traditional divorce laws required a transgression; mutual consent 
of a marriage’s failure was not grounds for divorce, instead one spouse had to accuse the other, 
generally, of adultery. It was common practice under this regime for spouses to “collude, lie, and 
perjure themselves in court” (Buehler 1995), and for the court to look the other way. This 
practice resulted in divorces being much easier to obtain than the written law would have 
allowed.  
Traditional divorce laws were based on and perpetuated gender roles. Both in the fault 
and alimony stages of a divorce proceeding, evidence was presented on each spouses’ fulfillment 
of the gendered marriage contract. While both spouses were punished for adultery, albeit wives 
generally more severely than husbands, grounds against a husband included failure to support 
while those against a wife included inattention to family affairs or spending too much energy 
outside of the home (Weitzman 1985). Due to the failure of traditional divorce laws to prevent 
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divorce and the mockery it was making of the legal system, California, in 1969, adopted a no-
fault provision. The trend to no-fault spread quickly across the states, and by 1987 every state 
had at least added a no-fault option while 12 had completely eliminated fault grounds (Buehler 
1995).  
The introduction of the no-fault option in divorce proceedings made divorces easier to 
obtain and reduced the acrimonious and adversarial tensions between spouses; however, this 
change alone would not eliminate the gendered marriage. As Weitzman (1985) explained, 
alimony allotments were based upon traditional gendered roles, where the husband would 
support the wife and she would raise the children, even after divorce. It is possible that the 
removal of fault-based alimony, which occurred in some states, developed as a result of changing 
gendered ideologies of marriage. In other words, in states where the gendered opportunity 
structures of the larger society were more hospitable to women, the fault requirements of 
alimony were also most open to change. A greater opportunity structure for women would 
reduce their reliance on men for support and would reduce the state’s interest in promoting a 
gendered marriage that no longer reflected actual behavior. Only 22 states eliminated fault from 
their alimony decisions. This paper will see if in fact the gendered opportunity structures of a 
state are related to the form of no-fault divorce adopted.  
Theoretical Framework 
 
 Previous studies of the change to no-fault divorce have failed to frame their research 
within the sociology of law paradigm. Generally, the sociology of law perspective argues that 
changes in law are due to the interaction of three factors: social actors, societal ideas, and social 
context (Grana et al. 2002). Within this framework, the various general theories of society guide 
the identification of each factor. As sociological theories present different views of the world, 
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their views on how change happens vary. For a structural functionalist, change is a top down 
process in which political elites make non-partisan decisions for the greater good of society. This 
is seen in explanations of the change to no-fault divorce laws which focus on the dissonance of 
official divorce laws and divorce law in practice. The conflict/feminist perspective, however, 
sees change as the result of a bottom up struggle, as seen in this research’s focus on the change in 
the gender opportunity structure and its influence on the adoption of no-fault divorce laws. I will 
now examine each of these perspectives and how they frame the change to no-fault divorce.  
The first perspective sees the law as a moral agent that works to keep a society coherent. 
Structural functionalism as prescribed by Durkheim (Banakar & Travers 2002) sees law as moral 
guidance which creates a cohesive society. Within this framework, although a law could be 
classified as oppressive, it could still be considered a good law because its basic function is to 
maintain societal balance. Law in this view is non-antagonistic; it is developed by non-partisan 
experts with the best interests of society in mind (Banakar & Travers 2002).  A major critique of 
early formations of this perspective is its inability to explain why laws change. In response to 
this limitation, in 1966, Parsons developed three theories of change: system maintenance, 
structural differentiation, and adaptive upgrading. System maintenance sees legal change as a 
way to restore the balance of a functional society, and structural differentiation focuses on the 
development of new institutions within society for a redistribution of societal responsibilities 
which works to increase or restore the functionality of the system. Adaptive upgrading refers to 
changes in a society that increase functionality through a redistribution of resources. According 
to Parsons, all of these changes may occur without disrupting the overall structure of a society 
(Harper & Leicht 2002).    
Within structural functionalism, the adoption of no-fault divorce could be seen as  
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adaptive upgrading or system maintenance, whereby the change in divorce law was beneficial to 
society at large. Structural functionalism identifies policy makers as the social actors, social 
ideas would be focused on creating a more efficient divorce procedure, and social context would 
be the disruption of the proper functioning of the old divorce laws. While this description of 
change is not entirely unsupported (Jacob 1988, Weitzman 1995), as a top down theory, it cannot 
capture the complete societal picture. While it is probably true that many state legislatures were 
inclined to change their laws because they were no longer functional, this does not explain why 
the laws became dysfunctional. Something had to have changed in the wider society that was 
making divorce laws no longer appropriate. This change, as proposed by this paper, was in the 
gendered opportunity structure. While this paper does not dismiss the validity of arguments 
framed in the structural functionalist perspective, it does suggest that a look at the change to no-
fault from the conflict/feminist perspective will illuminate the source of the dysfunction.  
Conflict theory frames law as a mechanism of oppression, whereby those with power 
(money and prestige) are able to exert their will over others. Within this frame, change in the law 
occurs when the oppressed party rebels against the status quo (Vago 2000). While feminism is 
fractured over the source of and remedy for women’s oppression, they all agree that, particularly 
during the 1960s and 1970s, traditional marital roles are oppressive (Osmond & Thorne 1993). 
As described above, traditional marriage reinforced and maintained a gender hierarchy. This 
gender hierarchy was reflected in the larger society, and until there was a change in one, there 
would not be a change in the other. The shift in the gendered opportunity structure that occurred 
between 1950 and 1970 greatly altered gender roles in families. From the conflict/feminist 
perspective the social actors are woman and men, the social ideas are gender equality, and the 
social context would be the shift in the gendered opportunity structure.  
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 With the basics of each legal perspective laid out, this paper now turns to what these 
propositions suggest about the reasons for the adoption of a “pure” no-fault or a mixed fault 
system. The functionalist perspective suggests that the adoption of a pure no-fault divorce system 
is more likely to occur in states where the divergence between actual divorce proceedings and 
the law as written were the most extreme. Change in the law here would reduce dissatisfaction 
with the system by removing the pervasive hypocrisy of divorce litigation. Pure no-fault would 
also reduce acrimony between partners because the adversarial nature of divorce proceedings 
would be gone. In essence, the function of divorce law – to preserve those marriage that could be 
saved and to end with as little tension or sham evidence as possible those marriages that were 
irretrievably rendered – would be operating smoothly once again. Change did not result from an 
organized movement to achieve gender equality rather, it occurred incrementally to get the 
system back in sync (Fine & Fine 1994, Jacob 1988, Weitzman 1985). 
This theory of the change in divorce law is supported by some empirical studies. Previous 
theorizing on the change in divorce law has consistently reported the same social conditions: 
primarily that fault based divorce was ineffective. Marriage was not breaking up due to legalized 
types of fault (adultery, cruelty and desertion), these were only the symptoms of marital failure 
based in a context of conflicts in attitude, personality, or other difficulties (Phillips 1988). There 
was use of collusion and perjury to get out of marriages under this fault system and leniency in 
courts for proof of fault (Phillips 1988, Rheinstein 1972, Wheeler 1974). These factors, in 
addition to migration, that is married persons moving from one jurisdiction to another with more 
lax divorce laws (Fine & Fine 1994, Rheinstein 1972, Wheeler 1974), were widespread towards 
the end of the fault-based system and effectively undermined its ability to prevent divorce from 
occurring. Still, this does not explain why some states implemented more broad reform whereas  
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others adopted more limited measures. 
The conflict/feminist perspective, in contrast, posits that pure no-fault reform was a direct 
challenge to the gendered basis of prior divorce laws. States that adopted a pure no-fault system 
should be those in which women had more access to educational, employment, and political 
arenas. Variations in these state-level gendered opportunity structures are themselves the result 
of prior group conflict, political protests, and social movements meant to secure more equality 
and access to status and material resources for women, which lead to directly challenging the 
gendered nature of family and family law. Pure no-fault should be adopted by states with more 
greatly altered gendered opportunity structures because the ideological and behavioral 
underpinnings of gender inequality are more salient. The change to no-fault divorce should not 
be seen as a change that occurred in a vacuum, but one that occurred along side other legal 
changes to remove gender discrimination from laws (Buehler 1995). 
 Weitzman (1985), as mentioned briefly above, identifies the gendered nature of 
traditional family law. Marriage was an institution based on gendered roles and responsibilities. 
In this system, the gendered spheres discussed above were not just a social idea, but a legal 
prescription; men were breadwinners and women were housewives, and deviation from these 
roles was not acceptable and in fact punishable under the traditional system. Roles were not just 
gendered; they were also hierarchical, making men the legal representative of the family. This 
system of patriarchy resulted in women marrying younger, forgoing experiences in higher 
education and the labor force because of their irrelevance to home-making, in addition to 
stripping them of any individuality or ownership, even of self. Women were required by law to 
take their husbands last name, to be subservient to his wishes on where to live, and to submit 
entirely to his sexual desires. Marriage, in the traditional system, was also a life long 
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commitment and partnership. Although roles were not equal and women were not part of the 
public economy, all familial property was considered to belong equally to each party. So, 
although a woman might not contribute to the actual accumulation of familial property, her role 
within the household was acknowledged and rewarded with equal ownership of what her labor 
allowed her husband to acquire. Weitzman (1985) goes on to argue that the change to no-fault 
erased these conceptions of marriage; no-fault is a gender neutral system that does not assume 
the continuation of gendered roles by former spouses after a divorce. This reflects the reality of 
women’s participation in the public sphere; even though men were not moving into the private 
sphere, women’s increased involvement in the public sphere directly contradicted the 
dichotomous ideologies reinforced by the traditional divorce system. Under the no-fault system, 
spouses are not punished for straying from traditional gender roles, nor are they rewarded for 
fulfilling them which, Weitzman (1985) argues, leads to increased movement of women out of 
the home and a continuation of the erosion of separate spheres.  
As predicted by the conflict/feminist perspective, prior to the change in law there were 
marked shifts in women’s roles and ideas about women’s roles. The change in gender ideology 
occurred alongside, and was influenced by a trend the emerged in the 1960s to emphasize 
individualism over fulfillment of societal roles. Between 1950 and 1970, women’s behavior 
shifted away from the traditional model of marriage as described by Weitzman (1985). For both 
women and men in the 1950s, women’s role as mother and housewife was considered to be their 
primary and most important identity. Society was bombarded in this period by experts exalting 
the traditional gender roles as the natural order. Girls in this period were completing fewer years 
of higher education, marrying at younger ages, and having more babies than the earlier cohort. 
Women who did complete college in this period also lacked career aspirations, wanting only a 
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family and a house (Friedan 1963). This trend continued into the early 1960s, until women began 
seeing the gap between the egalitarian idealism imparted by higher education and the lack of 
prestige and value actually afforded to “occupation housewife” (Rosenberg 1992). In the 1960s 
and 1970s, women were marrying later, attending and graduating college more often, delaying 
childbirth (due to previous two characteristics), and more women were remaining in the work 
force despite the presence of small children at home (Bianchi & Spain 1984). These changes in 
women’s behavior occurred concurrently with changes in attitudes about women’s roles.  
Thornton and Freedman (1979) found that between 1962 and 1977, there was a 
significant increase in women’s attitudes toward egalitarian gender relations. In 1962, women 
with more education and with more work experience held more egalitarian beliefs with the 
latter’s attitudes being the most egalitarian. Shifts in egalitarianism from 1962 to 1977 were 
more pronounced for women with husbands who had more education, and who were in the 
youngest age bracket in 1962. Thornton and Freedman found that all women in the 1977 survey 
showed increases in their egalitarian attitudes regardless of their experiences in the intervening 
years, however, women who increased their education and work experience showed the largest 
increases in egalitarianism. Despite the scarcity, or lack, of research on gender ideologies prior to 
1970, researchers have noted that men, to this day, tend to hold more traditional gender 
ideologies and that shifts in men’s attitudes have continuously lagged behind women’s 
(Ciabattari 2001). Further, gender ideologies did not change on their own. Prior to the feminist 
movement of this period, the civil rights movement had brought the language of equality to the 
foreground of social consciousness (Bianchi & Casper 2002). With the general lexicon of 
equality established, the introduction and emphasis on self-realization emerged. This belief 
system advocates “self-development: Each person should develop a fulfilling, independent self 
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instead of merely sacrificing oneself to one’s partner…that roles within marriage should be 
flexible and negotiable” (Cherlin 2004).  
Empirical support for the conflict/feminist perspective is found in works that emphasize 
changes in the values and norms of the larger society (Goode 1993), such as a rise in the belief 
that people have a right to get a divorce if they are unhappy, and that it is not the states’ place to 
regulate divorce (Jacob 1988, Minow 1997, Whitehead 1997). Alterations in economic 
opportunities developed in the years before the change to no fault that reduced the gains of 
marriage for both parties (Parkman 1992) and increased women’s independence (Goode 1993, 
Jacob 1988, Parkman 1992, Whitehead 1997). Researchers have also considered changes at the 
individual level as an explanation for divorce law change. As people became more focused on 
themselves as individuals, the traditional bonds of marriage and their constraints on divorce 
became less salient and thus, societal imperatives to support marriage as a gendered institution 
also weakened (Carl Schneider as described in Kay 1987, Whitehead 1997). 
In addition, a brief look at the progression of women’s social status in American society 
shows how the change to no fault divorce can be viewed as the next step in a slow process to 
undo the gender hierarchy implicitly built into our constitutional system. Joan Hoff-Wilson 
(1989) has developed four categories of women’s constitutional experiences: a period of 
constitutional neglect (1787-1872), a period of constitutional discrimination (1872-1908), a 
period of constitutional protection (1908-1963), and a period of constitutional equality (1963-
1987). In the fist period, gender roles and ideologies matched. The gender ideologies of men and 
women dictated that a woman’s place was in the home. Motherhood was not just part of biology, 
but was considered to be woman’s “vocation.” Women were disqualified from public life 
because of what was believed to be all women’s natural attributes, “physical weakness,  
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sentimentality, purity, meekness, piousness” (Baker 1984).  
During this period, marriage in America, like most American law, was based on a 
conception created within England’s common law system. According to Blackstone, women 
have no legal existence within a marital relationship. This practice of covertures merges a man 
and woman into a single entity in the eyes of the law; although there is nothing inherently 
gendered with this idea, in England’s system, and therefore America’s, the practice was gendered 
and all the powers of an individual were stripped from the woman and vested in the man. The 
husband gains control not only over all family property, contract, and suffrage rights, but also 
over the individual members of the family (Greenberg 1998).  
With this familial relationship in place, the legislative neglect of women can be 
understood. Firstly, women were not included in the Constitution or Bill of Rights; women were 
neither explicitly included nor excluded. Women’s status did not need to be defined because the 
men writing the Constitution did not consider a woman a political entity separate from her 
husband; his rights were considered one and the same as family rights (Hoff-Wilson 1989). 
Women’s forced dependence on husbands was somewhat altered with the Married Women’s 
Property Act of 1830. This act eased covertures laws by increasing the ability of women to retain 
their own separate property (Basch 1986). Constitutional neglect was possible because women 
were not forcefully attempting to break out of gender norms. 
The change to discrimination occurred because some women—a select group— from a 
high social class with extensive education, began to challenge traditional gender roles by 
attempting to participate in the public sphere. These women wanted full citizenship rights and 
could now argue for them with the 14th Amendment. In this period, women were denied rights 
not based on legal doctrine, but on traditional gender ideologies (Hoff-Wilson 1987). The period 
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of protection arose because the industrial revolution and massive urbanization had forced many 
women into the wage labor force. While “64% of working class families relied on incomes 
beyond the husbands” (Roark et al. 2003) in 1900, only 3% of white married women worked 
outside the home. Despite, or possibly because, some women were working in industry, the “cult 
of domesticity” persisted through the 19th century. Because of this ideology, middle class 
women, whose subsistence did not require them to work, did not work. They also could afford to 
hire working class women to perform domestic tasks. The free time hired household workers 
provided middle class women permitted them to spend their time working for reforms. These 
reforms were shaped by middle class values and therefore strongly reinforced traditional gender 
ideologies (Roark et al. 2003). Protective legislation was a result of the interaction of an 
unavoidable change in gender roles and the preservation of traditional gender ideologies. In 
essence, since roles changed out of necessity, traditional gender ideologies were not challenged.  
The move to no-fault divorce occurs in the fourth period, constitutional equality, which 
was a result of continuing change in roles finally being juxtaposed with a change in gender 
ideologies. The second wave of feminism was emerging in this period, and liberal feminists, 
trained in activism through the Civil Rights Movement, pushed for legal change as a path to 
gender equality (Osmond & Thorne 1993). The major laws which spurred this period were the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the addition of the word “sex” to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act (Hoff-Wilson 1989). In this period, the Court acknowledges the societal shifts in gender 
ideologies and prohibits the legal sanction of the traditional gender hierarchy.   
The legal history presented above demonstrates how gender stratification was challenged 
and finally removed from the laws. The removal of gender discrimination at the national level is 
an indication of mass societal change in both ideologies and behaviors. While the states are 
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subservient to the legal doctrine espoused by the Supreme Court, changes at the state level are 
directly influenced by the current atmosphere of that state, hence the variation in the adoption of 
no-fault divorce. There was a national push for the removal of the legal prescription of gender 
roles, which would legitimate changes at the state level in those laws that were based on gender 
ideologies. The variation in the type of no-fault system adopted is a reflection of state level 
openness to shifting gender roles. States that had historically more open gender opportunity 
structures, according to the conflict/feminist perspective, would take the cue from national legal 
changes and do away with all gender considerations in divorce proceedings. Those states who 
were not accepting of women in expanding roles would grudgingly comply by only partially 
removing fault. Conversely, the structural functionalist perspective would deemphasize the 
impact of shifting gender relations and focus instead on the need to reduce the dissonance 
between the law and practice. Those states retaining fault in alimony decisions may have 
experienced less of a divergence from the written law to its application. 
Hypotheses 
 This thesis examines two hypotheses that stem from the theoretical perspectives.  
First, the paper investigates whether the type of divorce reform implemented by a state is 
associated with its implementation of divorce law prior to reform. The functionalist perspective 
contends that those states with permissive divorce laws in action, as opposed to written, would 
be more likely to change to a pure no-fault system in order to resolve the dissonance between the 
law and behavior. Second, the paper investigates whether variation in the type of divorce reform 
implemented is associated with a state’s gendered opportunity structure. The conflict/feminist 
perspective posits that states with more opportunities for women in educational, economic, and 
political institutions would have implemented no-fault provisions for both divorce proceedings 
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and alimony apportionments because their historical openness to gender equality would propel 
them to remove ascribed gendered roles completely. In contrast, states with less opportunity for 
women would have retained fault in alimony decisions because traditional gendered roles were 
more entrenched. 
Data, Variables and Methods 
 
 Data for this analysis are from three primary sources: The IPUMS-USA 
(http://usa.ipums.org/usa/) provided individual-level data on adults ages 17 and over from the 
1950 and 1960 decennial census which have been aggregated into state-level measures; the 
Statistical Abstracts (http://www.census.gov/statab/www/) published data on state characteristics 
from 1950 and 1960; and state legislators’ gender composition and suffrage background are from 
Cox (1996). 
 The dependent variable in this analysis is the type of no-fault divorce system adopted by 
the states. States are classified into two groups: those that adopted a pure no-fault divorce system 
and those that retained fault for alimony decisions. Nevada, Hawaii and Alaska are omitted, 
Hawaii and Alaska because they were not states until 1959 and consistent data are not available 
for 1950 and Nevada because its historically lax divorce laws are an anomaly. Classifications of 
the remaining 47 states are based on data from Ellman and Lorh (1998), and Table 1 shows this 
classification of the states. 
Arizona Indiana New Mexico Alabama Mississippi Rhode Island
Arkansas Iowa Oklahoma Connecticut Missouri South Carolina
California Kansas Oregon Georgia New Hampshire South Dakota
Colorado Maine Utah Kentucky New York Tennessee
Delaware Minnesota Washington Louisiana North Carolina Texas
Florida Montana Wisconsin Maryland North Dakota Vermont
Idaho Nebraska Massachusetts Ohio Virginia
Illinois New Jersey Michigan Pennsylvania West Virginia
Wyoming
Table 1. States By Divorce Law System
"Pure" No-Fault Fault in Alimony
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 Table 2 shows the variable coding and source for independent variables used in this 
analysis. Characteristics of the gendered opportunity structure consist of measures of women’s 
access to higher education and employment, the presence of “elite allies” in state legislators, 
state levels of “Maternal Aid,” and marital and parental composition (McCammon et al. 2001, 
Soule and Olzak 2004). 
Table 2. Measures of Gendered Opportunity Structures - Independent Variables 
Variable Coding Mean Minimum Maximum 
Highest Grade 1950* State average educational level, women 17 and older 12.505 10.775 13.71 
Highest Grade 1950,     
women over 25* 
State average educational level, women 25 and 
older 12.271 10.447 13.527 
Highest Grade 1960* State average educational level, women 17 and older 13.046 11.815 14.097 
Highest Grade 1960,     
women over 25* 
State average educational level, women 25 and 
older 12.858 11.400 13.988 
Higher Education 1950^ Women's proportion of adult enrollment in higher education 0.319 0.233 0.379 
Higher Education 1960^ Women's proportion of adult enrollment in higher education 0.373 0.305 0.433 
In Labor Force 1950* Proportion of all women in the labor force 0.269 0.182 0.354 
In Labor Force 1960* Proportion of all women in the labor force 0.354 0.262 0.425 
Occupational Income 1950* State average occupational income in $100s $5.368 $3.507 $7.951 
Occupational Income  1960* State average occupational income in $100s $11.807 $8.494 $14.057 
Occupational Income, WM     
1950-1960* 
Women's change from 1950 to 1960 minus 
men's change from 1950 to 1960 2.780 0.654 5.427 
Suffrage prior to 19th Am~ 0= partial or no suffrage; 1= full suffrage 0.340 0.000 1.000 
State Legislatures 1950~ Proportion of women state representatives 0.025 0.000 0.120 
State Legislatures 1960~ Proportion of women state representatives 0.038 0.000 0.199 
Number of Children 1950,     
women under 24* 
State average number of children per woman 
under age of 24 0.609 0.299 0.877 
Number of Children 1960, 
women under 24* 
State average number of children per woman 
under age of 24 0.671 0.410 0.880 
Maternal Aid 1950^ Federal money allocated to state in $1,000s $221.364 $54.000 $565.700 
Maternal Aid 1960^ Federal money allocated to state in $1,000s $348.700 $56.200 $896.600 
Never Married 1950,    
women under 24* 
Proportion of women under 24 who’ve never 
married 0.500 0.331 0.676 
Never Married 1960,    
women under 24* 
Proportion of women under 24 who’ve never 
married 0.465 0.371 0.618 
Permissiveness 
Implementation Index" 
1=Very Strict; 2=Strict; 3=Moderate; 
4=Permissive; 5=Very Permissive 2.915 1.000 5.000 
*Variable from IPUMS-USA; ^Variable from Statistical Abstract; ~ Variable from Cox (1996); "Variable from Stetson & Wright 
(1975) 
 
 Women’s access to higher education is reflected by the average years of education and 
higher education enrollment. Highest grade of education was originally recorded in the IPUMS-
USA as years of education, and was aggregated to the state level. This variable was created for 
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1950 and 1960 for all women, 17 and older, and was also constructed in the same fashion for 
both decades for women 25 and older. The proportion of women enrolled in institutions of higher 
education was constructed for each state by dividing the total number of women enrolled by the 
total number of adults enrolled. This measure was constructed in 1950 and 1960. These measures 
provide a picture of the variation in women’s access to education across states. 
 Two measures were used to determine the extent of access to employment women 
enjoyed in the various states, current labor force participation and occupational income. Labor 
force participation was calculated for 1950 and 1960 by calculating for each state the proportion 
of women currently working out of the total number of women respondents. Occupational 
income, also constructed for 1950 and 1960, is provided in the IPUMS-USA as the median 
income, in hundreds of dollars, of people within an occupation category. A state mean was 
calculated for this variable from the aggregated individual-level data for women. An additional 
measure was created for this variable that measured the difference of change from 1950 to 1960 
between women and men. After creating the state level means for women, as described above, 
the same procedure was followed for men. A difference measure was then created for both 
women and men by subtracting their 1950 mean from the 1960 mean. The final measure, 
occupational income WM 1950-1960 in Table 2, was then calculated by taking the state level 
difference between the decades for women and subtracting the state level difference between the 
decades for men. This measure was included as a way to look at women’s shifting position in 
society; increases in women’s wages relative to men’s provide an idea of women’s acceptance in 
the work force. As women have been historically paid lower wages than men, a more 
pronounced increase in women’s wages would indicate that they are either moving into higher 
paying occupations, or that women’s occupations are being better compensated. Both of these 
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possibilities would hint at women being valued more in the workforce and that the assumption of 
women as workers only second to their dominant role of housewife was fading. 
 Political opportunity was measured with two variables, suffrage prior to the 19th 
Amendment and the proportion of women in state legislatures. Both of these variables were 
constructed from the information provided in Cox (1996). A state’s prior suffrage was coded as 
zero if women in the state had no suffrage or partial suffrage (many states granted women the 
vote in school and local elections while still prohibiting their participation in national and 
presidential elections) and one if women enjoyed full suffrage prior to the ratification of the 19th 
Amendment. Women in state legislatures were created by taking the number of women serving 
over the total number of representatives. This variable was constructed for 1950 and 1960. These 
measures provide an idea of women’s access to political opportunity; states with longer history 
of women’s voting rights may be more committed to an acceptance of women in roles outside of 
the home, and women elected to state legislatures indicates the current acceptance of women in 
political roles. 
 Maternal aid was provided in the Statistical Abstracts as the amount of federal grants 
allocated to each state in $1,000s for maternal and child health care services in 1950 and 1960. 
This measure was included because states have historically used maternal aid as a method of 
keeping women out of the labor force. Two measures of familial composition have also been 
included; average number of children to women under age 24 and the proportion of women 
under age 24 who have never married. Number of children to women under age 24 is the state 
mean of the aggregated individual-level number of children for women 24 and younger for both 
1950 and 1960. Women who have never married is the proportion of women in every state who 
reported never being married over the total number of respondents. This variable was limited to 
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women under the age of 24 and was constructed for 1950 and 1960. These measures are included 
because women’s delay in starting a family indicates their internalization and desire to utilize 
their greater access in the opportunity structure.  
 The last measure included in the analysis is the permissiveness index (Rheinstein 1972, 
Stetson & Wright 1975). This index was based on surveys from attorneys and judge involved in 
divorce proceedings; the respondents rated how divorce cases were really treated. The scale for 
this measure ranged from 1 to 95; this was grouped into 5 classifications of very strict, strict, 
medium, permissive, and very permissive (Rheinstein 1972), which this research has coded as 1 
indicating the strictest law and 5 the most permissive. States whose implementation did not 
match their written laws, states with high values on the permissiveness index, may be more 
likely to adopt a “pure” no-fault system to alleviate the discrepancies.  
Results 
 Independent-Samples T Tests are used to determine whether gendered opportunity 
structures and divorce law permissiveness vary between states that adopted a pure no-fault 
divorce system and those that retained fault for alimony decisions. Table 3 shows the results of 
this analysis. The T-Test results of the educational opportunity structure found that highest grade 
of education was significantly different between pure no-fault and fault in alimony states. In pure 
no-fault states, women age 17 and older averaged 12.9 and 13.4 years of education in 1950 and 
1960 respectively, while mixed fault states averaged only 12.2 and 12.7. The pattern was the 
same for the state averages of women over 25; pure no-fault states averaged 12.7 and 13.3 in 
1950 and 1960, and mixed fault states averaged only 11.9 and 12.5. No significant results were 
found for women’s enrollment in higher education. The only aspect of the employment 
opportunity structure found to be significantly different between the groups was the change 
 22
between women and men’s occupational income (Occupational Income WM 1950-1960). 
Women’s income in pure no-fault states increased $325 more than men’s income, while in mixed 
fault states women’s income only increased $237 over men’s income change. 
Table 3. Independent T-Test Results 
Gendered Opportunity Structures 
Pure No 
Fault State 
Means 
Fault in 
Alimony 
State Means 
T Sig. (2 tailed) 
Education       
Highest Grade 1950* 12.897 12.160 3.624 0.001 
Highest Grade 1950, women over 25^* 12.690 11.903 3.783 0.000 
Highest Grade 1960* 13.416 12.721 4.411 0.000 
Highest Grade 1960, women over 25* 13.261 12.503 4.309 0.000 
Higher Education 1950^ 0.312 0.325 1.298 0.202 
Higher Education 1960 0.369 0.376 0.879 0.384 
Employment       
In Labor Force 1950 0.263 0.275 0.932 0.357 
In Labor Force 1960^ 0.348 0.359 1.093 0.281 
Occupational Income 1950 5.306 5.423 0.361 0.720 
Occupational Income 1950,  
employed women only^ 19.986 19.518 1.015 0.316 
Occupational Income 1960^ 12.093 11.555 1.465 0.151 
Occupational Income 1960, 
employed women only^ 19.978 19.530 1.794 0.080 
Occupational Income - WM 1950-1960* 3.247 2.369 2.720 0.009 
Political       
Suffrage prior to 19th Am^* 0.545 0.160 2.922 0.006 
State Legislatures 1950 0.024 0.027 0.354 0.725 
State Legislatures 1960 0.038 0.038 0.009 0.993 
Familial Characteristics       
Number of Children 1950, women under 24 0.622 0.599 0.522 0.604 
Number of Children 1960, women under 24 0.702 0.643 1.953 0.057 
Never Married 1950, women under 24 0.487 0.513 1.144 0.259 
Never Married 1960, women under 24* 0.443 0.484 2.454 0.018 
Maternal Aid 1950^* 154.077 280.576 3.677 0.001 
Maternal Aid 1960* 275.127 413.444 2.299 0.026 
Classification of Divorce Laws       
Permissiveness Implementation Index* 3.500 2.400 2.944 0.005 
^ unequal variance across groups 
* statistically significant mean difference 
 
 Within the political opportunity structure, this test found that states that adopted a pure 
no-fault divorce system were significantly more likely to have granted women full suffrage prior 
to the ratification of the 19th Amendment; 54% of pure no-fault states granted full suffrage prior 
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to the 19th Am. and only 16% of mixed fault states did. Women’s representation in state 
legislatures was not significantly different between the two groups. Tests of the familial 
opportunity structure found that there was not a significant difference between groups for the 
average number of children born to women under age 24, nor were there significant differences 
between groups for the proportion of women under age 24 who had never married in 1950. The 
T-test did find that the proportion of women under age 24 who had never married in 1960 was 
significantly greater in states that retained fault in their alimony decisions. States that retained 
fault in their alimony allocations also had significantly higher means than pure no-fault states in 
regard to the amount of maternal aid provided. Pure no-fault states only received $154,000 and 
$275,000 in 1950 and 1960, while mixed fault states received $280,000 and $413,000. The last 
variable tested, divorce law permissiveness index, found that states that adopted a pure no-fault 
divorce system were significantly more permissive, averaging 3.5, than those states that retained 
fault in alimony, averaging 2.4.  
Conclusions 
 
 The descriptive results support both of the hypotheses. As predicted from the 
functionalist perspective, the states that adopted a pure no-fault system had significantly more 
permissive laws than those that retained fault in alimony decisions. Since structural 
functionalism sees changes in the law as an adaptive process, states where attorneys and judges 
were both aware of and an integral part of the evasion of the strict traditional divorce laws would 
have a more drastic change in their divorce system to correct the imbalance. The adoption of a 
pure no-fault system eliminates the incentive to create false charges by making them entirely 
irrelevant to divorce proceedings, thus restoring the integrity and functionality of the law. 
 The second hypothesis proposed that those states with a more open opportunity structure 
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for women would adopt pure no-fault legislation. This was also supported. From the 
conflict/feminist perspective, laws changed because the traditional gender roles prescribed by it 
were no longer, or at least were becoming less, applicable to women’s behavior. Strong support 
was found for the influence of educational opportunities on the adoption of pure no-fault. As 
education is a mediator for many of the other variables, work, income, and family demographics, 
a strong relationship between the education variables and the type of legislation adopted is 
expected. That the relationship was strong with women over 25 and not just all women indicates 
that these states may have a stronger historical trend of egalitarianism. Women in these states 
must have had more access to education or delayed marriage longer, both of which hint at some 
acceptability of women in roles other than wife and mother.  
 The lack of a significant difference between the two groups of states for women’s labor 
force participation could be due to the generality of the variable. Women enter the workforce for 
various reasons, and it is likely that women’s employment is similar between states with 
different gendered opportunity structures. Further, the category of labor force participation did 
not differentiate between full and part time employment. This aspect of women’s employment 
would be expected to vary by state, with more women working full time in states with open 
opportunity structures. Also, as seen in the legal review of women’s status, participation in the 
workforce might not be directly tied with gender ideologies. What is indicative of greater 
egalitarianism in the pure no-fault states is that the decade change between women and men’s 
income was greater. Women in the pure no-fault states were gaining on men’s earning power 
more so than in the mixed states. Women in the pure no-fault states had to either be working in 
better jobs, or were being better compensated; this, again, hints at a greater acceptability of  
women in roles other than wife and mother. 
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 While neither of the variables measuring women’s role in legislatures were significant, 
more states that adopted pure no-fault legislation had granted women suffrage prior to the 
passage of the 19th Amendment. This is an indicator of those states’ historicity of greater 
egalitarianism. The results of the maternal aid variables are harder to interpret. While they could 
be a sign that the pure no-fault states did not strictly enforce traditional gender roles, they may 
also be influenced by state poverty. Maternal aid was significantly greater in 1950 and 1960 in 
states that retained fault in alimony. This paternalistic aid from the government implies that 
women either were thought to be incapable of self-sufficiency or, were not given the opportunity 
to be self-sufficient due to the emphasis on traditional gender roles. On the other hand, states 
receiving more government aid may just have higher numbers of indigent families. In this case, 
the amount of government aid would not be a direct indicator of the gendered opportunity 
structure, as a two parent family with traditional or non-traditional gender roles may just be 
unable to make ends meet. Additional research into impact of state level poverty and familial 
composition on this measure would be needed before any conclusions on its impact can be 
determined. Contrary to what was expected, states that retained fault in alimony allocations had 
more women postponing marriage until after age 25. It could be that women’s egalitarian 
ideologies were stable across the various states, and that those women living in states with a less 
open opportunity structure would rebel against the institution of marriage more than those 
women who were able to pursue interests outside of the family. 
 By applying the sociology of law framework to the question of the relationship between 
the emergence of no-fault divorce and societal changes, this research has shown reason to 
believe that a more complete understanding of legal change can be obtained by employing 
various perspectives simultaneously in the search for causality. This research has found further 
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support for previous studies that focused on the change to no-fault divorce at the legislative level. 
A T-Test analysis of the type of divorce law adopted by the states did show a relationship 
between the degree of dysfunction and the extent of the remedy, supporting the structural 
functionalist perspective of the change in law. However, this view alone cannot offer a complete 
explanation of the move to no-fault legislation. 
 Beginning the analysis with the elites, policy makers, fails to identify the source of the 
dysfunction. To only argue that policy makers changed the laws because they were ineffective, 
begs the question of what caused the laws to become ineffective. The review of historical trends 
in society and law and the T-Test results of this research offer a possible explanation to fill this 
void. Through a conflict/feminist perspective a source of conflict was identified, the clash 
between the traditional gendered marriage and women’s actual behavior. The strong relationship 
between the adoption of a pure no-fault divorce system and a more open gendered opportunity 
structure reveals how societal factors play an active role in shaping the laws that regulate them. 
 Despite the significant results and conclusions drawn from them, it should be noted that 
this research has been limited by the data available. A major assumption of this work is that there 
was in fact a major shift in gender ideologies during this period, and that these changes would be 
more pronounced for women than men. While all of the measures included in this study are 
behaviors, it is this conception of gender ideologies that guided their inclusion. Few expansive 
empirical studies of gender ideologies in this period are available, and as such state level 
measures of gender ideologies were not able to be constructed. The construction of a state 
measure of gender ideologies would make salient the assumed relationship between changes in 
women’s behaviors and their ideologies.  
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